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NOTES
DOES A LIEN EXIST ON A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR OIL
AND GAS FURNISHED FOR ITS
TRANSPORTATION ?*

FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT

ESTER BELLE BROWN, &c.,

-

-

-

-

Plaintiffs,

-

-

Defendant.

vs.--OPiNIoN OF THE COURT

MR~S. H. H1. (MARGARET C.) WILSON,

The question herein submitted for decision is whether the
plaintiff has a lien upon the automobile of the defendant for oil
and gas furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant and used m
the operation of the automobile.
In the case of Doll v Young, 149 Ky 34, the Court, in discussing statutory lines, said.
"The security afforded to mechanics and material men by the statutes of the several states of the union has no recognition in the common law, but rests and must find support in the statute creating the
lien or security. The language of each particular statute therefore
must govern its interpretation without much aid from the judicial
declarations from other jurisdictions."

If I understand the language correctly, it means that each
statute giving a lien to mechanics and material men must be construed according to the language of the statute, and tins rule of
construction is, of course, applicable to all other statutory liens.
Section 3463, of the Kentucky Statutes, gives a lien to one
who performs labor and furnishes material in the erection, alterlig or repairing of a house, building or other structure, or for
any fixture or machinery therein, or for the erection of cellars,
cisterns, vaults, wells or for the improvement in any manner of
* An opinion by Judge R. C. Stoll, formerly Judge Fayette Circuit Court. This is the third in a series of opinions by Judge Stoll. In
many instances they discuss the constitutionality of statutes and questions of law not as yet passed upon by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

DOES A LIE

EiS T ON A MOTOR VEICLE

real estate under certain conditions. This statute clearly means
that the labor or material must actually go into the improvement
of the realty, so in the case of Avery v. Woodruff, 144 Ky 227,
the Court held that a material man had a lien for lumber out of
wlnch the concrete forms were made for the creation of a concrete building, the Court saying"In the case at bar the material furnished by the appellant was
raw lumber to be used in the erection of the concrete building, and it
was contemplated by the parties at the time it was furnished that it
would be totally used up in making forms in the erection of Avery &

Sons' plant. If the lumber had been furnished to make a scaffold, molds
or forms with the intention of using them in the erection of that
building and then carry them away and use them in constructing other
buildings, then no lien would attach, as they would be regarded as a
part of the appliances of the workman and would occupy the same
place as a hammer, saw, or other tool used by the workman for wnch
no lien is allowed by the statute."

On the other hand in the case of BsckeZ v. National Surety
Company, 156 Ky 695, the court held that the owner of an
engine who rents it to a sewer contractor to use in the construction of a sewer has no mechanic's lien for the rent of the engine,
although used m the construction of the sewer.
Section 2462, of the Kentucky Statutes, gives a lien on railroads to all persons who furnish labor, material, supplies or
teams for the construction or vmprovement of a canal, railroad
or turnpike, and therefore the Court held, in the case of Carson
& Co. v Shelton, Etc., 128 Ky 248, that a storekeeper who furnished supplies to hands who were working on a railroad was not
entitled to a lien for supplies so furnished because they were not
furnished for the construction or improvement of the road.
It will be noticed that Sections 2463 and 2492 of the Kentacky Statutes, as construed by the Court of Appeals, require
by express language that the material or supplies should actually
go into the construction or inprovement of the property
The Automobile Statute, however, differs materially in
language from the two statutes above referred to, in that it
nowhere contains any express language requiring the accessories
or supplies to go into the improvement of the car. This statute
is in part as follows. (2739h-1.)
"All persons, individuals or corporations in conducting the business of selling, repairing, furnishing accessories or supplies for motor
vehicles shall have a lien on such motor vehicle for the reasonable or
agreed charges for repairs, work done, accessories or supplies furnished
for or on machines, and for storing or keeping said machine, and such
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persons, individuals or corporations may detain all motor vehicles in
their possession on which work has been done by them until the reasonable or agreed charges therefor have been paid."

The question then to be deternnned is whether the supplies
for motor vehicles must actually go into the improvement or
repair of a motor vehicle, or whether it includes gasoline and oil,
which are necessary for its operation. It must be remembered
that Courts do not concern themselves with the wisdom of an
Act, that is for other branches of government. It is the duty
of the judiciary only to interpret an act, and in so construing it
the Courts seek to arrive at the legislative intention. Unless
prohibited by the constitution the Legislature may pass any act
it desires, and, this being the function of the legislative branch
of the government, it is the duty of the Executive to approve or
disprove the Act, or to permit it to become a law without his
approval.
It must be presumed that the legislative branch of the government has knowledge of the statutes of Kentucky as well as
the interpretation placed on such statutes by the Courts; and m
Sections 2463 and 2492 the Legislature, by the language in the
statute itself, provided that the material and supplies should go
into the improvement or repair of the property, and the courts,
following the language of the Legislature, so construed the statutes.
In the Motor Vehicle Statute, there is no such expressed
provision, and so in order to arrive at the intention of the Legislature, we must consider why the Legislature used different
language in the Motor Vehicle Statute than it used in the other
statutes above referred to, and to ascertain, if possible, the significance of this fact. If the Legislature meant that the supplies
must go into the repair and improvement of an automobile, we
are naturally compelled to inquire why the Legislature, having
knowledge of the former statutes and the interpretation placed
on them by the Courts, did not so expressly provide, and why
it did not use language identical or similar to that used i the
former statutes. By using different language did the Legislature not mean something different I
On the other hand, under Section 2487 of the Kentucky
Statutes, when a railroad, manufacturing plant or other enterprise, as set out in the Statute, becomes insolvent and is in the
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hands of a trustee, etc., for the benefit of creditors, the employees
bave a lien on the property "and the persons who shall have
furnished materials or supplies for carrying on or operating any
railroad shall likewise have a lien" on the property This
language has also been construed by the Court of Appeals, and
the language of the statute, as well as the construction placed on
it by the Court of Appeals, are presumed to be known to the
Legislature.
In the Mot6r Vehicles Law it is not provided that a lien
shall exist for supplies used in carrying on or operating the
vehicle, and, therefore, the question naturally arises that, if the
Legislature meant to give a lien for supplies used in the mere
operation of a motor vehicle, why did it not say so, as it did in
the statute last quoted? It will then be seen that the Legislature, knowing the language used in the previous laws enacted
by it, and knowing the interpretation placed on these laws by
the Courts, failed to use the language used in either of the above
mentioned statutes, so in accordance with the principles laid
down in the case of Doll v. Young, supra, the Motor Vehicle.
Statute must be construed in accordance with the language used
in it. The other statutes and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals construing them are of very little assistance in construmng the statute in question. The statute gives a lien to persons conducting the business of selling, repairing, furnishing
accessories or supplies for motor vehicles for the reasonable or
agreed charges for repairs, work done, accessories or supplies
furnished for or on machines, and for storing and keeping said
machines.
An automobile accessory, as I understand the term, means
something that is added to the automobile, such as a spot-light,
a clock, a speedometer, a bumper, a shock absorber, or such
similar device not always necessary perhaps to its actual operation, but something which increases the utility of the vehicle as
originally manufactured, and which renders its operation more
comfortable, more safe or more convement. A bolt used in
repairing an automobile is not an accessory, neither is a new
piston rod which is placed in the engine of the machine to take
the place of an old one. Such things are merely supplies used
for the purpose of repairing the automobile. Upholstering and
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the curled hair padding used in such work and covered by
leather or cloth would also come under the head of supplies.
In arriving at the proper construction of the language of
tins statute, let us leave out, for the moment, the word accessories, for I have already determined the proper definition of
this word. The statute would then read that the lien is given
for repairs, work done and supplies for or on the machine. What
supplies ' Manifestly, supplies necessary for repairing or for
doing work on the machine. I am strengthened in this belief by
the further provisions of the Statute, wnch, when read as a
whole, indicates unmistakably that the lien given is for work done
on a motor vehicle, for accessories furnished for a motor vehicle,
for repairs done on and for the supplies used in making repairs
on or for an automobile and that the word supplies, as used m
the statute, does not include oil or gasoline used in the operation
of a motor vehicle. Surely the Legislature did not mean, when
it passed this Act, that the Standard Oil Company, or the Indian
Refining Company, or any other corporation who furnishes a
person at his home or place of business oil or gasoline to operate
a motor vehicle should be given a lien on the car, nor did it
intend that the various gasoline filling stations should have a lien
on every car to which it furnishes gasoline or oil. Such a result
would, in my opinion, place a construction on the statute that
was never intended by the Legislature. In construing a statute
it is always proper to consider the history of the time and ascertain the evil which the acts was designed to prevent. It is a
matter of common knowledge that, prior to the enactment of this
statute, many owners of automobiles frequently placed their
cars in a garage for storage, or for the purpose of having them
repaired, or to have new accessories placed upon them, and then
would drive away without paying the bill which had been incurred, leaving the garage-men to the unsatisfactory and inadequate
remedy of an ordinary suit at law. A careful reading of this
Act as a whole leads to the conclusion that the motor vehicle
upon which the lien is given must be in the custody of the person in whose favor it accrues. If this were not so the Act would
not provide as it clearly does, that the lien shall not be lost by
the removal of such motor vehicle from the garage, shop, or
premises of the person, individual or corporation performing
labor, repairing, furnishing accessories or supplies therefor.
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Nothing can be removed until it has theretofore been at or in the
place from which it is taken. Generally, it is evident that the
statute contemplates such .accessories and supplies as. are
ordinarily put on or furnished under circumstances winch
require the automobile to be placed in the custody of the person
performing the work, and it is a fact, known generally, that oil
and gas are such commodities as may be furnished to an automobile owner without the machine ever being in the garage or
place which sells these commodities. If the term supplies, as
used in this statute, means gasoline or oil, then certainly every
person furnishing them is entitled to a lien, and yet many persons have gasoline and oil delivered to their own premises by oil
compames, and the motor vehicle in which they are used is never
in the custody of the person or company dealing in these commodities. If these things are supplies within the meaning of
this Act, then the Company that delivers a can of oil at the home
of the 'automobile owner has a lien upon the car in which it is
used, just the same as if the oil had been delivered to the ear
directly from the tank in front of the garage or from a receptacle
inside the garage, and this I do not believe that the Legislature
ever intended to do.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that under Chapter 75, of
the Acts of 1918, which is Section 2739h-1 of the Kentucky Statutes, no lien exists on a motor vehicle for oil or gasoline furnished
for the purpose of its operation.
I am of the opinion that the demurrer to the petition should
be overruled, for it states a cause of action for a debt, but
inasmuch as the exhibit controls the petition, the petition should
be so reformed as to set out the amount claimed to be due for
oil and gasoline used in the operation of the car separately from
the other items for which the plaintiff has a lien, and then the
Court will strike all portions of the petition which claim a lien
for oil and gasoline furnished for the operation of the car.
The motion to paragraph the answer should be sustained,
and I will not rule on the motions of the plaintiff until the petition is properly paragraphed.
R. C. STOLL, Judge.

